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In the context of law[3,43] and in what is more generally 
called “fact analysis”[46] it has been argued that discourses on 
evaluative matters should include a clear indication of one’s 
standpoint, because standpoints are personal and, hence, can 
vary among different discussants. One’s standpoint is said to 
affect the weighing of arguments constructed on the basis of 
new information and the propositions (hypotheses) that one 
entertains. Declaring one’s standpoint is important to favor 
mutual understanding and to help recognize the sources of 
potential disagreement. This paper will adhere to this precept 
by following Anderson and Twining[3] who consider that a 
standpoint may be declared by answering questions of the 
following kind: Who am I? At what stage and in what process 
am I? What am I trying to do? Although Anderson and Twining 
raise these questions in the context of individual case analysis, 
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This paper is concerned with the contribution of forensic science to the legal process by helping reduce uncertainty. Although it is now 
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“The modern conception of scientific method as an objective and value‑free learning procedure is the source of the distrust and disrespect 
shown to science by many people today. In defiance of this conception, I believe the (…) community should openly participate in 
the development of a revitalised image, accentuating the crucial role of beliefs and values in the conduct of scientific activity. The 
conception of science as a belief-centered and value-oriented process is supported technically by the operational subjective theory of 
probability (….).”[32]
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it also makes sense to consider them in a broader discussion of 
evaluating the strength of scientific results in the legal process.
This paper is written from the viewpoint of a forensic scientist, 
with a main interest in the generic principles that underlie 
inference in situations characterized by uncertainty, a topic 
that typically arises when scientists are asked to assist a 
court in dealing with results of forensic examinations. This 
typically comes at an advanced stage in the legal process 
where the guilt or innocence of an individual is at issue, and 
information provided by forensic scientists needs to be placed 
meaningfully into a context, alongside other elements in the 
case. The discussion pursued throughout this paper intends 
to look at this stage from a probabilistic viewpoint. The 
argument will not, however, be directed toward justifying the 
choice of probability as a reference framework for reasoning 
under uncertainty. There is already strong and persuasive 
argument on this elsewhere in existing literature.[39] Moreover, 
the probability is now being increasingly accepted, not 
only in theory,[2,44] but also among practitioners.[1,4] Instead, 
attention will be drawn to some of the argumentative and 
practical consequences of choosing probability—in one of 
its interpretations—as the general framework of reasoning. 
The main emphasis is placed on the implications for forensic 
scientists in their activity at the interface between science and 
the law, although the considerations may also be of interest 
in broader legal contexts.
The main objective of this paper is to justify the thesis 
that a beneficial application of probability as a measure 
of uncertainty should rely on a subjectivist position, that 
is, probability ought to be interpreted as a measure of an 
individual’s belief about something (e.g., an event of interest) 
that is unknown to that individual. Although, on first sight, 
this topic relates to the academic discussion because of its 
reference to the nature of probability, it is also of direct 
practical relevance. This will be illustrated through an example 
drawn from the context of forensic DNA analysis, a proposal 
regarding the elaboration of probabilities by scientists and the 
subsequent prescription of such probabilities to legal decision 
makers.[12] Although such a suggestion may appear to conflict 
with procedural requirements of contemporary legal systems, 
it will be argued in this discussion that such conflict can be 
avoided if probability is properly considered from a subjective 
point of view.
From a mathematical and statistical point of view, the 
question of how to interpret probability pertains to the specific 
application. For forensic science, however, the discussion 
touches on fundamental issues and is the object of recurrent 
debates.1 Notwithstanding the current state still leaves room 
for thought-provoking discussion on aspects that ask for 
reconciling answers. The discussion proposed in this paper 
seeks to provide an original contribution to this topic by 
re-examining a selection of arguments and standpoints from 
1A recent example is R v T[42] (EWCA Crim 2439). A detailed discussion of 
this case can be found in the special issue of Law, Probability and Risk (Vol. 
11, Issue 4, 2012).
several foundational disciplines, in particular mathematical 
statistics and philosophy of science, that otherwise tend to 
be sidestepped in discussions that remain largely confined to 
forensic science and the law. In essence, this paper will promote 
an interdisciplinary perspective in approaching selected 
conceptual and practical questions that pertain to reasoning 
under uncertainty in forensic science and the law.
Structure of the paper
Section 2 (Motivation) starts by providing examples of questions 
about probability and its nature as encountered in applied 
contexts, including forensic science and the law, with the intention 
of illustrating the importance of the main topic pursued in this 
paper, which is the choice of an interpretation of the abstract 
concept of probability. Section 3 (Interpreting Probability) 
presents both traditional approaches and the subjectivist approach 
for interpreting probability, with an emphasis on how the latter 
can avoid complications associated with the former. Section 4 
(Discussion) further explores the consequences of adopting a 
subjective perspective for what may be termed the ongoing 
“probabilization” of forensic science. The conclusion (Section 5) 
assesses the sense in which the adoption of this understanding of 
probability in forensic science and the law is supported elsewhere 
in literature,[38] and how this may benefit society.
motIvatIon
What is a probability? What does it mean to express a 
probability? Should scientists assign probabilities? If so, what 
type of probability? Questions of this kind continue to trouble 
many scientists, and not only in legal contexts. The questions 
arise similarly in many other areas where reasoning under 
uncertainty plays a central role. Aven[5] provides a telling 
illustration of this through an anecdote about his professional 
experience in risk analysis:
“I had an active role in the analysis and on the day I referred to, 
I presented the results of the assessment to the top management 
of the company. Then one of the managers asked me:
“What is the meaning of the probability figures you have 
presented?”
It was a good question. The company planned to spend large sums 
on the basis of this assessment and to adequately use its results 
he needed to understand what the numbers really expressed.
The problem was that I could not give the manager a good 
answer. Yes, I fret and grieve today over the answer. And I 
said to myself that this I could not live with. I am an expert 
on probability but have no clear and convincing answers to 
this basic question.”[5]
This example clearly illustrates that apparently simple 
questions about probability can turn out to be challenging and 
that there is a need to deal with this issue in practical settings 
if scientists do not want to fail in their duty to assist recipients 
of expert information.
It requires little effort to imagine that the situation described 
in the above quote similarly arises at the interface between 
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forensic science and the law. It is sufficient to replace “manager” 
by “lawyer” or “judge,” “expert” by “forensic scientist,” and 
“spend large sums on the basis of this assessment” by “taking 
a decision with potentially profound consequences for the 
defendant.” Thus, where the probability is already an integral 
part of evaluation and reporting by forensic science experts, 
courts may legitimately ask scientists to explain the meaning 
of the probability figures they have presented. Moreover, 
they may also ask how the court ought to use the proposed 
probability figures.
Turning to core forensic science, discussions about how to 
deal with probability can readily be found. For the purpose of 
illustration, consider the commentary “Use of prior odds for 
missing persons identifications,”[12] where the authors hold that 
“[t]he forensic DNA community needs to develop guidelines 
for objectively computing prior odds.”[12]2 In this quote, the 
prior odds refer to the event that particular (unidentified) 
human remains are those of a particular missing person. The 
quote raises a series of tightly intertwined issues regarding the 
understanding of the concept of probability. I have addressed 
some of them in previous comments.[10,50] The subsequent 
sections of this paper will expound on further aspects, in 
particular on whether scientists should elaborate probabilities, 
whether they ought to recommend probabilities to other 
participants in the legal process, and whether “computed” 
probabilities can be regarded as objective. Mainly, it will 
be pointed out that the reasoned apprehension and use of 
probabilities is rooted in deeper considerations about the 
interpretation of probability with respect to particular needs 
of the legal context of the application.
InterpretIng probabIlIty
Probability in its uninterpreted form
Mathematical probability, as it is most commonly known, is 
formulated via the analysis of a function that satisfies three 
uninterpreted axioms. These are known as “the Kolmogorov 
axioms.” A theorem deriving from these axioms, known as 
Bayes’ theorem, is central to the understanding of statistical 
inference. In one of its forms, this theorem says that the prior 
odds of a proposition (hypothesis) H, written O (H), modify 
to so-called posterior odds through consideration of new 
information (i.e., data).[39] Posterior odds are commonly written 
O (H|D), where the “|” denotes “conditional” and D are some 
data, such as results of scientific examinations. In forensic 
contexts, it is common to write E (short for “evidence”) instead 
of D. In addition to E, the scientific finding considered by the 
court, there will also be background knowledge I, and strictly 
one should write O (H|E and I) to denote this explicitly. This 
2 Note that “odds,” a technical term in probability theory, designates an 
equivalent form for expressing a probability. That is, odds on an event 
E is the ratio of the probability of the event E to that of its complement 
−E. The term “prior” refers to the particular moment when the odds 
are considered, that is prior to the consideration of new information. 
Alternatively, the term “initial” is sometimes used instead of “prior.” 
See also Section 3.1 (Probability in its uninterpreted form).
way of looking at E and I already amounts to an interpretation 
with respect to a particular context of application: The law.
From a mathematical point of view, Bayes’ theorem is universally 
accepted as correct. It is equally uncontroversial that the entities 
upon which Bayes’ theorem builds, that are probabilities, are 
numbers that obey the rules of probability calculus. These rules 
or laws define only a very limited number of restrictions so that 
they can be seen as a very liberal concept.[34] That is, probability 
theory defines the scope of numerical values that probabilities 
can take and how probabilities are to be combined, but the theory 
does not tell one what value a probability in any given case should 
take. Scientists seem rather uncomfortable with this liberty as 
is illustrated by the fact that they seek to conceive of “devices” 
amenable to “produce” probabilities. In forensic science, one 
such instance was mentioned in Section 2 (Motivation), drawn 
from the context of missing person identification. Similarly, 
recommendations can also be found in other forensic disciplines, 
such as comparative examinations of marks, where it has been 
suggested that prior probabilities − in particular, equal prior 
probabilities - ought to be derived with the help of notions 
such as the principle of maximum entropy and the principle of 
indifference.[25] Both these principles are borrowed from other 
science disciplines. The applicability of such ideas to inference 
problems in forensic science is questionable on a conceptual 
account,[8,9] but perhaps more intriguing is that, through their 
technical names, these principles may suggest themselves to 
the general practitioner as necessary constraints in the same 
way as the laws of probability. However, this is clearly not 
the case. Although thinking individuals are of course free to 
choose additional constraints on their probabilities, coherence, 
as stipulated by probability theory, do not require them to do so.
One way to look at the “laws of probability,” as they stand, is to 
consider them as a collection of uninterpreted terms and rules. 
That is, the meaning to be assigned to the terms that make up 
the formulation of the laws of probability can be considered 
independently from the formulation of the laws itself. This means 
that it is necessary to interpret the abstract probability calculus 
in order to make it meaningful within the context of a particular 
branch of application. This is a subtle task, however, because it 
extends the discussion to further aspects, such as the specification 
of criteria to judge the adequacy of an interpretation of probability. 
It is worth emphasizing that this view is based on a formalist view 
of mathematics as opposed to the constructivist view.[31] The 
so-called intuitionist-constructive attitude to mathematics is that 
it is a formal language for saying specific things. Every formula 
in the language means something, beginning with the most basic 
items. In particular, in de Finetti’s construction “the laws” derive 
from meaningful assertions regarding prices. Stated otherwise, 
in this view one does not consider probability, for example, to 
be a function on a space of sets, as in Kolmogorov’s axioms, but 
rather a price assessed for specific economic transactions if the 
sentence assessed is true, and 0 if not.
We now move on to a discussion of interpretations of 
probability commonly encountered in forensic science and the 
law. A particular emphasis will be placed on examining the 
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extent to which the definitions of probability can be termed 
“operational.”
Limitations of selected interpretations of probability
In judicial contexts, two perspectives on probabilities appear 
recurrently. Their designation varies somewhat throughout 
literature, but generally they can be classified according to 
the subjectivist belief-type approach and approaches that 
do not subscribe to a belief-type perspective. Among the 
latter are the so-called “frequency concept” and Laplace’s[33] 
“classical definition.” It is often said that it is hardly helpful to 
oppose the two perspectives, notably in short communications 
such as the present discussion, where limitations of space 
inevitably lead to a partial presentation of the competing views. 
Notwithstanding, it is sometimes felt that the subjectivist 
belief-type interpretation of probability cannot be advocated 
without offering some justification as to why other common 
interpretations are left aside. Thus, they are briefly addressed 
below. By retaining practical applicability as a main criterion 
for comparison, it is hoped that the reader will accept a short 
digression on nonsubjectivist approaches, and the subsequent 
adherence to the view that probability ought to be understood 
as personal belief.
As one of the most commonly known definitions of probability, 
the frequentist interpretation involves, as its name says, the 
notion of frequency of occurrence of an event in a sequence 
of so-called “repeated trials” (under stable conditions). This 
concept gravitates around the idea of “chance,” a notion 
associated with the relative frequency with which some 
outcome occurs on repeated trials. This way of thinking about 
the variability associated with target outcomes is appealing 
because it lends itself to idealizations, such as the consideration 
of infinitely long‑runs, or, infinite sequences. As such, this 
is a conceptual nicety, but it appears to be hard to maintain 
for a reasonable person facing a real-world problem. In the 
context of law, Lindley has challenged the frequency concept 
as follows:
“There is nothing wrong with the frequency interpretation, 
or chance. It has not been used in this treatment because 
it is often useless. What is the chance that the defendant 
is guilty? Are we to imagine a sequence of trials in which 
the judgements, ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, are made and the 
frequency of the former found? It will not work because 
it confuses the judgement of guilt, but, more importantly, 
because it is impossible to conceive of a suitable sequence. 
Do we repeat the same trial with a different jury; or with the 
same jury but different lawyers; or do we take all Scottish 
trials; or only Scottish trials for the same offence? The whole 
idea of chance is preposterous in this context.”[35]
In similar terms, Kaplan wrote:
“Given a typical contested trial, for instance, it is meaningless 
to speak of the probability of the defendant’s guilt in terms of 
the number of times he would be guilty in an infinite number of 
exactly similar cases because, first, there are not even two exactly 
similar cases, and, second, even if there were many identical cases 
the court must reach a verdict, not a ratio, in the case at bar.”[30]
Due to the unclear meaning of “repeated trials” that, strictly 
speaking, do not exist, the frequentist definition of probability 
is vague. In the forensic context, absurd considerations as 
illustrated in the quotation above appear to be inevitable because 
of the very features of the topic under study. Typically, events of 
legal interest have properties—notably lacking replicability and 
varying (i.e., unstable) circumstances—that are opposed to basic 
tenets of the frequency view, such as long-run replicability and 
stable conditions. This is an applicability problem, a reason for 
which the frequency concept is often avoided. Note, however, 
that this objection relates to the identification of frequency 
as a probability. There is no problem with the concept of 
frequency (of occurrence) as such. Both a count of the number 
of items in a certain class (i.e., the absolute frequency) and the 
proportion of the number of items in a certain class (i.e., the 
relative frequency, obtained by dividing the absolute frequency 
by the total number of items) can be useful concepts. Moreover, 
it is often useful to assess probabilities for the possible value 
of such frequencies.
Another interpretation of probability, different from the 
belief‑type perspective, is the so‑called “classical definition” 
of probability as given by the works of Pierre-Simon Laplace. 
This interpretation maintains that the probability of an event is 
given by the ratio of the situations in which that event holds, 
that is the event is verified, to the number of all possible cases 
which, according to information one has, appear all equally 
possible. This definition also looks at a collection of cases and 
focuses on a proportion, but it is circular in the sense that it 
relies on the assumption of “equally probable cases,” for which 
no independent definition is given.
The subjectivist standpoint
From the notion of event to subjective probability
A characterizing feature of the interpretations of probability 
outlined in the previous section is their understanding of the 
notion of an event in terms of what may be called “collective.” 
Another view of the notion of event, which does not run 
into operational limitations as outlined above, emphasizes 
an “atomistic” view.[23] It considers an event as any detailed 
statement that can be ultimately either verified or disproved. 
In the light of this view, probability can be given a natural and 
nonconflicting interpretation: “(…) probability characterizes 
the knowing subject’s attitude with regard to a given 
statement.”[21] Probability thus describes the assessment of an 
individual making a subjective statement about something that 
is unknown to this individual. In the words of de Finetti, “[t]
he notion of probability (….) consists (….) of the (subjective) 
confidence level that a specific individual (I, You, or anybody 
else and anyone in his own way) has in the fact that a particular 
statement is true (…).”[20]3 According to this view, probability is 
not a characteristic of an event of interest. In particular, it is not 
3 Note, however, that the term “confidence” in this quote has nothing to do with 
the expression “confidence interval” used in frequentist statistics.
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a property of the physical world and that could be investigated 
independently of a thinking individual. It represents a judgment 
made by someone based on his/her assessment of the available 
evidence.
Defining probability operationally
Understanding probability as a relationship between a person 
and the world that this person is contemplating,[34] satisfies an 
operational definition. An operational definition is one that 
allows one “(…) to give an effective meaning to a notion and 
not merely an appearance of such in a metaphysical-verbalistic 
sense (…).”[18] It is “(…) a definition based on a criterion which 
allows us to measure it. (…) the criterion, the operative part of 
the definition which enables us to measure it, consists in this 
case of testing, through the decisions of an individual (which 
are observable), his opinions (previsions, probabilities), which 
are not directly observable.”[18]
Stated otherwise, an operational relates probability “(…) to 
actual experiences, which are at least conceptually feasible.”[18]4
That being said, the question thus is how to measure an 
individual’s opinion, which is not directly observable. 
There are different devices available for eliciting a person’s 
probability. A very general approach says that to measure a 
person’s probability for a single event one can proceed in 
much the same way as measuring other things, that is by 
comparison with a standard. An elementary standard that 
can be expected to be the most widely understood, because 
of its simplicity is an urn or bag containing a certain number 
n of balls, of which m are white, and the remaining are 
black. Using this device, a person’s probability for an event, 
about which this person is uncertain, is equal to m/n if that 
person judges the event’s uncertainty to be the same as the 
uncertainty of drawing a white ball from the urn. Thus, 
the operational part of the measurement of an individual’s 
probability consists of adjusting the proportion of white balls 
until an observable point of indifference is achieved.5 This 
involves some important features. First, there is exactly one 
proportion that characterizes such a point of indifference as 
two different proportions express two different probabilities 
for extracting a white ball. Hence, the probability is given by a 
single number. Second, the measurement process concentrates 
on the single event (Section ‘From the notion of event to 
subjective probability’) of interest: There is exactly one ball 
to be drawn from the urn and there is only a single unique 
event for which our probability is being assessed. There are no 
repeated draws of balls as might be imagined by reference to 
frequentist ideas. Thus, in summary, the notion of probability 
can operationally be considered in terms of an equivalence 
judgment in comparison with various proportions.
4 The insistence on an operational definition is not original to the field of 
probability. de Finetti,[15,16,18] for example, refers repeatedly to physics.[11] 
Further references can also be found in Lad.[31]
5 As an aside, note that it is in the logic of this scheme to equate the sure event 
with an urn in which all balls are white and the impossible event with an urn 
with no white balls.
A side‑note on objectivity
An aspect that deserves a brief comment at this juncture is 
that persons inclined to question or doubt the subjective view 
of probability often advocate the notion of “objectivity” as 
the counterpart ideal. This notion is so widely and commonly 
used that its vague and usually undefined meaning often goes 
unnoticed. For example, the well-known National Academy 
of Science report[40] contains statements such as: “The goal is 
to make scientific investigations as objective as possible so 
the results do not depend on the investigator” (p. 107); “the 
premium that science places on precision, objectivity, critical 
thinking (…)” (p. 108); “this is not to say that tool mark [sic] 
analysis needs to be as objective as DNA analysis in order to 
provide value” (p. 130); “an attempt at an objective system for 
identifying “matches” (…)” (p. 133) or “(…) questioning of 
the value and scientific objectivity of such evidence” (p. 146). 
Such expressions intend to describe a feature of science and 
its practice that purportedly exists independently of human 
activity. This character is similarly transposed to probability 
as an aspect ascribed to the outside world, rather than as a 
connection between thinking individual and the outside world 
as emphasized in the subjectivist approach.
One is obviously free not to regard probability as a personal 
belief, but still one’s analyses are inevitably based on hypotheses 
that are judged reasonable. In forensic science, a typical example 
for this is found in models used to characterize the rarity of 
analytical features (e.g., DNA profiles). Evett and Weir, for 
instance, consider that “(…) objectivity is itself an illusion 
because it exists only within a framework of assumptions.”[26] 
They exemplify this position by arguing that “(…) we do not 
accept that DNA statistics are objective in the sense of being 
independent of human judgment. In spite of the often elegant 
mathematical arguments we have presented, we stress that the 
final statistical values depend wholly on the initial assumptions. 
The validity of these assumptions in any given case are [sic] a 
matter for expert opinion, so that we claim “objective science” 
can exist only within the framework of subjective judgment”[26] 
(This is a particular instance of a more general standpoint that 
Lindley has described as follows: “[M]y own view is that the 
probabilities that are essential for the appreciation of uncertain 
affairs, must be subjective (…). Objectivity is merely subjectivity 
when nearly everyone agrees.”[37] Similarly, Bernardo and Smith 
consider that “(…) objectivity has no meaning in this context 
apart from that pragmatically endowed by thinking of it as a 
shorthand for subjective consensus.”[7] Objectivity is sometimes 
upheld as an ideal because subjectivity is seen with prejudice and 
negative connotations such as partiality, bias, or arbitrariness. 
This is not the intended meaning; however, because subjectivity 
as an attribute of probability merely means that it is a personal 
judgment of an individual. To help avoid misunderstandings, 
standard literature on this interpretation of probability, including 
discussions with forensic scientists,[6,47] sometimes uses the 
term “personal” (i.e., personal probability) as an equivalent to 
“subjective.” It emphasizes that interpreting probability as belief 
thus is not tantamount to uninformed or deliberate opinion.
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dIscussIon: ImplIcatIons oF adoptIng subjectIve 
probabIlIty
The general outline of key aspects of the subjectivist 
interpretation of probability, as presented in Section 3.3 (The 
subectivist standpoint), sheds a clarifying light on questions 
and issues about the nature and understanding of probability 
raised in Section 2 (Motivation). Moreover, it also offers 
an opportunity to explore further implications regarding 
reasoning under uncertainty as encountered by forensic 
scientists and other participants in the legal process. We now 
turn to these.
Does it make sense to enquire about “the probability”?
“What is the probability that these unidentified human remains 
are those of this missing person?” This is one example of 
a question that might be asked in the context of forensic 
identification of human remains. At first sight, it would 
seem that this question is appropriately formulated, but from 
a genuinely subjectivist viewpoint one needs to conclude 
that the question does not make any sense. Missing person 
identification is surely an activity worthy of practicing, but the 
formulation “the probability” is defective. According to the 
belief-type interpretation of probability presented throughout 
Section 3.3 (The subectivist standpoint), probability only 
makes sense to an individual person. That may be you, the 
reader of these lines, the author of this text, or any other 
person. Reasoning individuals thus should enquire about 
their probability, not the probability. For de Finetti, it is this 
relative character of probability that deconstructs “(…) the 
myth of a true probability, existing in the “realm of darkness 
and mystery” of ultrasensible reality (…).”[22] Let us recall that 
he described his own position as follows:
“Probability exists for me only as a function of the degree of 
ignorance in which I find myself at the time; it would be absurd, 
even if it were not meaningless, to consider probability as a 
mysterious and unreachable metaphysical entity, existing in 
abstraction, on which the occurrence of an event somehow or 
other depends.”[22]
Arguing otherwise, still according to de Finetti, is prone to 
lead to absurd considerations:
“To consider probability (…) as a metaphysical entity that 
exists in abstract is like thinking that it is possible (without 
being Alice in Wonderland) that the cat’s smile can remain 
and continue to be visible even after the cat has disappeared. 
I have vehemently rejected all conceptions of probability in 
such an absolute sense (in the preface to the English edition 
of my treatise) by suggesting as a motto: “Probability does not 
exist” by which I mean that probability does not “exist” on its 
own, independently of the evaluations we make of it mentally 
or instinctively. As a result, it has no meaning to wonder “what 
probability is,” we should instead mediate (…) in which sense 
we evaluate it (…).”[19]
The question “what is the probability (…)” is not only defective 
because of the “the,” but also because of the “is”.
Are probabilities a case of computing?
In the absence of an explicit reference to a particular person, the 
notion of probability is suggestive of a property of the outside 
world that exists independently of the reasoning individual, 
and that could be worked out through the application of an 
abstract computational procedure. This seems to be the idea 
underlying the proposals for computing probabilities, as 
conveyed by the “guidelines for objectively computing prior 
odds,” mentioned previously in Section 2 (Motivation). On a 
conceptual account, this is a debatable view because it suggests 
that artificial devices or computational procedures6 could serve 
as a substitute for the expert’s reasoning. This is not meant to 
question the wider use of models7 for representing phenomena 
and processes of the real world at some level of abstraction. 
The point is that a distinction needs to be made between 
the specification of a model, the use, and the analysis of a 
model. Merely running a model can well reduce to an abstract 
operation run by a machine, but the definition of a model for the 
particular needs in a case at hand requires informed judgment 
by the scientist.[36] As noted by Lindley:
“In the application of Bayesian methods, you first need to 
assign some basic probabilities (…) to give the problem 
structure; then the computer can derive other probabilities. 
One must think about the basic values and it is not usually 
satisfactory to use (…) noninformative priors. You must 
think about the real quantities involved, like temperature or 
blood pressure, and not about symbols that represent them. 
This distinction between the thinking you and the unthinking, 
calculating personal computer is essential.”[29]
The opinion that one could obtain a probability as a direct 
output of the application of an abstract procedure also raises 
more fundamental problems. With respect to the principle 
of indifference, for example, literature in philosophy of 
science has objected against a rule that claims to “produce” 
probabilities out of “nothing,” by calling such a pretension 
epistemological magic:[45]
“Of course, there are always ways of transforming ignorance 
into knowledge – by further investigation and the accumulation 
of more information. It is the same with all “magic”; to get the 
rabbit out of the hat you first have to put him in. The principle 
of indifference tries to perform ‘real magic.’”[45]
At times, artificial devices for “deriving” probabilities are 
proposed as a way to deal with the commonly raised difficulty 
according to which “one does not know the probability,” so 
it is worthwhile to include this aspect in the discussion. The 
problem of (absence of ) “knowledge of the probability” may 
appear real to anybody thinking about the task of assigning 
a probability in a given case, in particular where this may 
be difficult to do. This, however, is neither an issue of 
6 A very general example is the idea of taking the initial probability of guilt to 
be 1/N if there are N people who could have committed the crime.
7 Typical examples for models in forensic science are found in population 
genetics, where models are specified to work out population proportions (i.e., 
proportions of populations that have particular genetic traits).
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“knowledge of probability,” nor a “problem” of probability 
itself. It is merely a problem of a particular interpretation of 
probability (i.e., other than the subjectivist interpretation). It is, 
in the words of de Finetti, a “pseudo-problem,”[17] that vanishes 
if probability is understood as personal belief:
“Among the answers that do not make sense, and cannot be 
admitted, are the following: “I do not know,” “I am ignorant 
of what the probability is,” “in my opinion the probability does 
not exist.” Probability (or prevision) is not something which 
in itself can be known or not known: It exists in that it serves 
to express, in a precise fashion, for each individual, his choice 
in his given state of ignorance.”[18]
The difficulties experienced in probability assessment 
relate only to the practice of the concept (of probability 
measurement), but not to the concept itself.[38]
Should scientists recommend probabilities?
Given that probability is a personal affair, it cannot be contested 
that scientists have their own opinions on a given issue. On some 
issues, their opinions may concur fairly and precisely while on 
others they may diverge. What can be questioned, however, 
is whether such opinion is contextually relevant and whether 
it should be imposed or recommended to other participants in 
the legal process. To use again the example of missing person 
identification, the question is whether a scientist should elaborate 
on prior probabilities for a proposition (i.e., regarding the origin 
of unidentified human remains) that is in the area of competence 
of another person (e.g., an official who is in charge of a decision). 
This kind of question arises analogously in virtually any branch 
where forensic science results are used to infer about propositions 
of interest in legal cases (e.g., the question whether a particular 
person wrote a signature, left a fingermark, etc.).
More generally, the recommendation and prescription of 
probabilities raises both procedural and conceptual questions. 
The procedural concerns are most typically illustrated with 
respect to prior probabilities:
“The expert, however, has no role in assessing the prior odds: 
These are for the fact‑finder, based on the nonexpert evidence 
she has heard. Nor has the expert any business in testifying in 
terms of the posterior odds; these, too, are for the fact‑finder, and 
because they can only be arrived at by assessing the prior odds, 
the expert cannot legitimately make statements about them. To 
put it less abstractly, the expert should not testify in terms such 
as “in my opinion the glass came from the broken window,” or 
“the blood probably came from the defendant,” because one 
can only reach conclusions of this sort by making assumptions 
about the strength of other evidence against the defendant.”[41]
This constitutes strong procedural advice against the 
recommendation of prior odds by forensic scientists. 
Interestingly, they concur entirely with the insight that stems 
from the conceptual account advocated throughout this paper: 
The very understanding of prior odds as a distinct personal 
belief of each reasoning individual opposes the idea that one 
ought to prescribe to others what their prior beliefs ought to 
be. The best that one can do in such situations is to establish 
the range of inferences that might be made from available 
evidence on the basis of a range of prior opinions.
A situation in which the elaboration of prior probabilities by 
scientists could be considered as procedurally and conceptually 
acceptable is when it is the scientist who is also in charge of 
acting upon his belief, as may be the case in some jurisdictions 
with coroners who investigate the cause and time of death for 
legal purpose.[50] Yet another situation in which scientists may 
legitimately formulate probabilities is when they intervene at 
the investigative phase and express, for example, an opinion 
about a matter that can reasonably be confined to technical and 
scientific considerations only (e.g., the cause of a technical 
failure, cause of a fire etc.).[28]
Further implications
The role of scientists in the legal process
That probability assignment is met with skepticism is not peculiar 
to forensic science and the law. The concern is well-known 
throughout science and has preoccupied the thinkers that have 
worked at the forefront of probability theory. Savage, for instance, 
has been most prudent by emphasizing the following:
“Quite contrary to a misconception that has been encountered, 
we do not advocate that the personal opinions of the statistician 
be foisted on the scientific community, the business executive, 
or other “clients” of the statistician. Rather, the role of the 
statistician is to help his clients mature and co-ordinate their 
own opinions.”[17]8
Lindley also uses the term “client” in reference to persons such 
as lawyers who need to reason with imperfect information:
“The philosophical position adopted here is that statistics is 
essentially the study of uncertainty and that the statistician’s 
role is to assist workers in other fields, the clients, who 
encounter uncertainty in their work.”[36]
“[I]n doing this, the subject, whose probabilities are being 
sought, the “you” in the language adopted here, is not the 
statistician, but the client, often a scientist who has asked for 
statistical advice. The statistician’s task is to articulate the 
scientist’s uncertainties in the language of probability, and 
then to compute with the numbers found.”[36]
This standpoint is well in agreement with traditional argument 
according to which probability concepts (in particular Bayes’ 
theorem) have long been presented and promoted as a way 
to clarify the respective roles of the court and the forensic 
scientists commissioned as experts witnesses.[49] It is the 
court’s or jury’s initial opinions, typically based on other 
evidence present in the file, that ought to be combined and, 
hence, refined with scientific findings provided by the forensic 
scientist. In essence, this translates Savage’s idea of “maturing 
opinions” quoted above. The understanding of probability as 
8 Chapter 8, “how to choose the initial probabilities,” p. 144; “English 
summary” by L. J. Savage for the joint paper with de Finetti[24] published 
in Italian.
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an expression of a personalized view is most supportive of this 
way of proceeding. As noted by Evett and Weir, “[u]ltimately, 
it must always be the jurors, or other triers of fact, whose belief 
in the proposition of an identical source that matters.”[26]
The probabilization of forensic science
In his paper entitled “the scientification of forensic practice,” 
Garbolino[27] argues that the introduction of probabilistic 
considerations in forensic science provides an instance of what 
the historian of science Cohen[13] has called the “probabilizing 
revolution,” a fundamental influence on a field through 
probability. In forensic science, the impact of probability is 
groundbreaking in that it provides, since its early usage by 
Darboux, Appell, and Poincaré in the Dreyfus case,[49] a reference 
scheme for measuring uncertainty that allows scientists and 
other participants in the legal process to investigate, expose, and 
communicate the strengths and limitations of scientific findings 
at unprecedented levels of insight. Moreover, the continuing 
accumulation of quantitative data that asks for coherent treatment, 
and novel frameworks for probabilistic model construction and 
analysis (e.g., Bayesian networks[48]), make the probabilization 
of forensic science an ongoing process. It is a process that adds 
value to the use of forensic science for legal purposes.
Notwithstanding the position of probability in legal 
proceedings is fragile. Beyond its uncontested mathematical 
foundations, the probability is perceived in divergent ways and 
disagreement exists about the extent to which it can be applied 
for evaluating forensic findings. Recurrent controversies over 
topics such as initial probabilities as referred to throughout this 
article exemplify this. It is worth noting, however, that such 
instances of disagreement are essentially ones that are rooted 
in the question of how to interpret probability; they are not 
an issue about probability as such. The proper choice of an 
interpretation of probability thus is central for a meaningful 
use in forensic practice and this, hence, represents a critical 
factor for the ongoing probabilization of forensic science. The 
subjectivist perspective offers one such interpretation. It is both 
a meaningful and operationally feasible interpretation that, 
according to the positions justified in the previous sections, 
can help avoid inferential impasses to which other common 
interpretations may lead.
conclusIons
The probabilization of forensic science is an important topic 
that, on a more general account, can be seen as part of a 
broader intellectual development according to which “(…) the 
availability of powerful and logical tools accessible to all is 
essentially a question of democracy, as it involves the ability 
of citizens to understand and control the decision-making 
processes upon which their welfare and their own lives 
depend.”9[14]
9 Translation by the author (Italics as in the original): “Così, la disponibilità di 
strumenti logici potenti e accessibili a tutti è essenzialmente una questione 
di democrazia, in quanto investe la possibilità dei cittadini di comprendere 
e controllare i processi decisionali dai quali dipende il loro benessere e la 
loro stessa vita.”14, p. 11
Understanding probability in a subjective perspective is 
valuable for this endeavor in that it emphasizes an individual’s 
viewpoint. Probability is not a concept that is exclusively 
reserved to scientists, but a personal matter that everyone 
ought to care about seriously because it is the key concept to 
“(…) equip you with enough skill, so that you can appreciate 
an uncertain situation sufficiently well to see whether another 
person, lawyer, politician, scientist, or journalist, is talking 
sense, posing the right questions, and obtaining sound 
answers.”[38] These features crystallize most prominently in the 
context of the legal process where the reasoning processes of the 
various participants ought to be individualized (i.e., personal), 
transparent and based on logical considerations. By embracing 
real situations faced by any reasoning individual, the 
subjectivist viewpoint emphasizes an operational perspective 
that is accessible to all participants in the legal process, yet 
encourages them to take on an active part and responsibility 
in the scrutinizing of reasoning processes. This offers a viable 
alternative to so-called objectivist concepts and probability 
interpretations that come at the cost of applicability problems.
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